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Executive Summary
T he City of Detroit’s bankruptcy was driven by a severe decline in revenues (and, importantly, not an increase in obligations to fund pensions). Depopulation and long-term unemployment caused Detroit’s property and income tax revenues to plummet. 
The state of Michigan exacerbated the problems by slashing revenue it 
shared with the city. The city’s overall expenses have declined over the 
last five years, although its financial expenses have increased. In addi-
tion, Wall Street sold risky financial instruments to the city, which now 
threaten the resolution of this crisis. To return Detroit to long-term fiscal 
health, the city must increase revenue and extract itself from the financial 
transactions that threaten to drain its budget even further.
T H E  S H O R T FA L L
Detroit’s emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, asserts that the city is bank-
rupt because it has $18 billion in long-term debt. However, that figure 
is irrelevant to analysis of Detroit’s insolvency and bankruptcy filing, 
highly inflated and, in large part, simply inaccurate. In reality, the city 
needs to address its cash flow shortfall, which the emergency manager 
pegs at only $198 million, although that number too may be inflated 
because it is based on extraordinarily aggressive assumptions of the con-
tributions the city needs to make to its pension funds.
Cash flow crisis.
In a corporate bankruptcy, the judge takes stock of a company’s total 
assets and liabilities because the company can be liquidated and all its 
assets sold to pay down its debts. However, municipal bankruptcies are 
inherently different because they do not contemplate the liquidation of 
a city. Municipal bankruptcies are about cash flow—a city’s ability to 
match revenue against expenses so that it can pay its bills. Under Chap-
ter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a municipality is eligible to 
file bankruptcy when it is unable to pay its debts as they come due.
This means that Detroit is bankrupt not because of its outstanding 
debt, but because it is no longer bringing in enough revenue to cover 
its immediate expenses. According to the city’s bankruptcy filing, the 
emergency manager projects a $198 million annual cash flow shortfall 
for fiscal year (FY) 2014 (though, as explained below, the portion of this 
amount that is related to pension fund contributions is an estimate that 
requires deeper analysis). To get out of bankruptcy, the city needs to 
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address this annual shortfall—whether it is $198 million or a smaller 
number—not its total outstanding long-term debt.
Total outstanding debt. 
Not only is the $18 billion outstanding debt figure irrelevant to De-
troit’s bankruptcy, it is also misleading and inflated. There are several 
reasons, including the following examples:
•	 The emergency manager includes $5.8 billion of the Water 
and Sewerage Department’s debt as a liability of the city, even 
though the Water and Sewerage Department serves more than 
3 million people all across southeastern Michigan, an area 
far larger than just the city of Detroit, which has just 714,000 
residents. This debt is not a liability of the city’s general fund; 
and, even if it were, only a fraction of it would allocable to the 
city. 
•	 The emergency manager’s assertion that the city’s pension 
funds have a $3.5 billion shortfall is an estimate, very 
different from the certain liability of a financial debt, based on 
calculations that use extreme assumptions that depart from 
most cities’ and states’ general practice. 
To pinpoint the causes of Detroit’s bankruptcy, it is necessary to iden-
tify the reasons for the city’s cash flow shortfall, which are best under-
stood through an analysis of the city’s revenue and expenses.
R E V E N U E
Detroit has been in a state of decline for several decades. The city’s 
population has fallen from a high mark of nearly 2 million residents in 
1950 to just 714,000 in 2010. This long-term decline has also taken a toll 
on the city’s revenue base, causing both property and income tax reve-
nues to shrink as homeowners and jobs have left the city. Altogether, De-
troit’s revenues have decreased by more than 20 percent since FY 2008, 
declining by $257.7 million.
Tax revenue.
Because of the Great Recession, this gradual decline in revenue 
became a massive leak. Detroit was hit particularly hard by both the 
foreclosure and unemployment crises. The number of employed Detroit 
residents fell by 53 percent from 2000 through 2012, but half of that 
decline occurred in a single year, 2008, as the recession took hold. 
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During the recession, property values declined substantially, eating 
into the city’s property tax base. The recession has cut deeply into key 
property and income tax revenue and fee revenue from utilities owned 
and operated by the city. 
State revenue sharing.
The state of Michigan has exacerbated Detroit’s revenue crisis by 
slashing $67 million in state revenue sharing with the city. About $24 
million dollars of these cuts were due to revenues shared  pursuant to the 
Michigan State Constitution, allocated among cities and towns based on 
population. Detroit’s allocation was reduced because of population loss 
in the 2010 census. However, the remaining $42.8 million (64 percent 
of the total state cuts) were due to statutory revenue sharing and were at 
the discretion of the state Legislature. By cutting revenue sharing with 
the city, the state effectively reduced its own budget challenges on the 
backs of the taxpayers of Detroit (and other cities). These cuts account 
for nearly a third of the city’s revenue losses between FY 2011 and FY 
2013, coming on the heels of the revenue losses from the Great Recession 
and tipping the city into the cash flow crisis that it is now experiencing. 
Furthermore, the Legislature placed strict limits on the city’s ability to 
raise revenue itself to offset these losses.
Corporate subsidies.
The city has provided significant tax subsidies to a large number of en-
terprises as incentives to engage in development projects in downtown 
Detroit. In some years, the city handed out as much as $20 million to pri-
vate interests. To the extent that the development would have occurred 
without these tax subsidies, or with less subsidies, the program was a 
burden on city revenues at a time when it was particularly damaging. In 
any event, the subsidies that have not yet been received should be treated 
as obligations of the city, in the same category as debt service and fund-
ing of future employee benefits, subject to readjustment to help resolve 
the cash flow crisis to the extent revenue is not increased to cover the 
demands on cash. 
E X P E N S E S
Contrary to widely held belief, Detroit does not have a spending prob-
lem. Since the onset of the Great Recession, the city’s total expenses have 
actually decreased by $356.3 million, driven by a 38 percent reduction 
($419.1 million in absolute terms) in operating expenses, although its 
financial expenses have gone up.  
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Operating expenses. 
Between FY 2008 and FY 2013, the city drastically cut operating ex-
penses by $419.1 million. This was accomplished in large part by laying 
off more than 2,350 workers, cutting worker pay, and reducing future 
healthcare and future benefit accruals for workers. The city reduced salary 
expenses by 30 percent between FY 2008 and FY 2013. Total operating 
expenses have been reduced by nearly 38 percent during that same time.
Legacy expenses.
The city’s “legacy expenses” increased by $62.8 million between FY 
2008 and FY 2013. These legacy expenses include the city’s debt service 
and financial expenses as well estimates of its future liability for health-
care and pension benefits it pays to retirees. A close look at the city’s 
legacy expenses reveals that this $62.8 million increase was driven heavi-
ly by the city’s complex financial deals, not retiree benefits.
•	 The city’s financial expenses increased by $38.5 million 
between FY 2008 and FY 2013, accounting for more than 60 
percent of the total increase in legacy expenses. 
•	 The city’s pension contribution expenses remained relatively 
flat, rising only $2 million during this time. The city’s 
contribution might have been larger if it had had more 
money, but increases in the actual contributions it did make 
did not contribute materially to the cash flow crisis. 
•	 The city’s healthcare contribution expenses increased by 
$24.3 million. This constitutes an increase of 3.25 percent, 
per year, which is less than the nationwide annual increase in 
healthcare costs of 4 percent.  
The city’s pension contributions in particular did not play a role in 
pushing it into bankruptcy because they did not contribute materially 
to the increase in the city’s legacy expenses that added to the cash flow 
shortfall. While the city’s healthcare contributions did increase, this was 
largely because of rising healthcare costs nationally, not because the city’s 
benefits were too generous. In fact, a comparative analysis of Detroit’s 
retiree benefits shows that its pension and healthcare benefits are in line 
with those of other comparable cities.
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Financial deals.
Detroit’s financial expenses have increased significantly, and that is a 
direct result of the complex financial deals Wall Street banks urged on 
the city over the last several years, even though its precarious cash flow 
position meant these deals posed a great threat to the city. The biggest 
contributing factor to the increase in Detroit’s legacy expenses is a series 
of complex deals it entered into in 2005 and 2006 to assume $1.6 billion 
in debt. Instead of issuing plain vanilla general obligation bonds, the city 
financed the debt using certificates of participation (COPs), which is a 
financial structure that municipalities often use to get around debt re-
strictions. Eight hundred million dollars of these COPs carried a variable 
interest rate, which the city synthetically converted to a fixed rate using 
interest rate swaps.
These swaps carried hidden risks, and these risks increased after the 
Federal Reserve drove down interest rates to near zero in response to the 
financial crisis. The deals included provisions that would allow the banks 
to terminate the swaps under specified conditions and collect termina-
tion payments, which would entitle the banks to immediate payment of 
all projected future value of the swaps to the bank counterparties. Such 
conditions included a credit rating downgrade of the city to a level below 
“investment grade,” appointment of an emergency manager to run the 
city and failure of the city to make timely payments. Projected future 
value balloons in low, short-term rate conditions. This is because the dif-
ference between the fixed swap payments made by the city and the float-
ing swap payments projected to be paid by the banks increases. Because 
all of these events have occurred, the banks are now demanding upwards 
of $250-350 million in swap termination payments.
These swap deals were particularly ill-suited for a city like Detroit, 
which had been hovering on the edge of a credit rating downgrade for 
years. Because the risk of a credit downgrade below “investment grade” 
was so great, the likelihood of a termination was imprudently high. The 
banks and insurance companies were in a far better position to under-
stand the magnitude of these risks and they had at least an ethical duty to 
forbear from providing the swaps under such precarious circumstances. 
The law recognizes special duties that sophisticated financial institutions 
owe to special entities like cities in providing complex financial products. 
A strong case can be made that the banks that sold these swaps may have 
breached their ethical, and possibly legal, obligations to the city in exe-
cuting these deals.
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C O N C LU S I O N
Detroit’s bankruptcy is, at its core, a cash flow problem caused by its 
inability to bring in enough revenue to pay its bills. While emergency 
manager Kevyn Orr has focused on cutting retiree benefits and reducing 
the city’s long-term liabilities to address the crisis, an analysis of the city’s 
finances reveals that his efforts are inappropriate and, in important ways, 
not rooted in fact. Detroit’s bankruptcy was primarily caused by a severe 
decline in revenue and exacerbated by complicated Wall Street deals 
that put its ability to pay its expenses at greater risk. To address the city’s 
cash flow shortfall and get it out of bankruptcy, the emergency manager 
should focus on increasing revenue and extricating the city from these 
toxic financial deals. Here are some recommendations for doing that:
•	 The emergency manager, ideally in collaboration with the 
state, needs to increase revenue by $198 million annually 
to bridge Detroit’s budget gap until structural programs 
can be put in place and the city can benefit from increased 
general economic improvement. This includes enlisting 
state involvement on an emergency basis and restoring 
discretionary state revenue sharing to pre-crisis levels. The 
shortfall amount can be reduced as FY 2014 proceeds by 
factors such as improved collection of unpaid taxes (which 
has yielded modest results to date). 
•	 The emergency manager should drop his proposal to move 
city workers to a defined contribution pension plan and 
abrogate vested pension benefits. The city’s pension fund 
contributions did not cause the crisis.  Reducing benefits 
runs counter to the long-term goal of structurally improving 
city services. Moreover, converting to a defined contribution 
plan at just the moment when new active employees will 
be added as services are improved (a goal of the emergency 
manager) would adversely affect the financial dynamics of the 
pension fund for existing retirees and other beneficiaries who 
have already vested under the defined benefit system. Over 
time, the new active employees will rebalance a fund that is 
currently top-heavy with retirees and will improve the long-
term investment horizon of the plan, to the benefit of city cash 
flow. 
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•	 The emergency manager should drop any plans to privatize 
or otherwise monetize the Water and Sewerage Department, 
since the asserted benefits of such a plan are not likely to be 
realized and, even if they were, would have no net effect on 
the current cash flow crisis. The sale price of the system or 
components represents an investment by a buyer that must be 
repaid by system revenues, the same as bonds issued against 
those revenues. If the sale price is applied to retire existing 
bonds, the effects balance out. If they are not used to retire 
bonds, it is just like issuing new debt, which presumably the 
system could do without selling off parts of itself. The plan 
calls for an annual payment to the city, but this payment is 
from user fee revenues net of operational expenses and debt 
service (and return on equity investment if true privatization 
is used), a financial structure that is parallel to the current 
system. 
•	 The emergency manager’s plan to pay the swap termination 
fees outside of the bankruptcy process should be abandoned. 
The bank counterparties should be made to bear the 
consequences of the original swap transaction, and they 
should be pushed to forego their projected profit (the measure 
of the termination payment), given the large profits they 
have already earned as a result of the unusually low interest 
rates that resulted from the financial crash. The emergency 
manager should also press for prorated rebates on the 
premiums for insurance on the swaps. And, if necessary, 
the state should be enlisted to guarantee the city’s swaps to 
avoid payment of termination fees. The termination fees will 
become smaller as interest rates rise over time, which they are 
likely to do.  
•	 The emergency manager should negotiate directly with the 
holders of the pension financing certificates of participation, 
apart from other unsecured creditors. The circumstances of 
the COPs issue are unique. Unless these circumstances are 
shown to have benign explanations that are not currently 
available generally to the public, the leverage that the 
emergency manager has over this negotiation is high. 
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•	 The emergency manager should reclaim tax subsidies and 
other expenditures to incentivize investment in the downtown 
area. These tax subsidies should be treated similarly to the 
city’s other financial obligations. The residents of Detroit have 
already suffered as a result of the crisis, as have the public 
employees. The recipients of tax expenditures should share in 
the sacrifice as well. 
Once Detroit gets through this immediate crisis, the city’s elected offi-
cials, hopefully working collaboratively with the state Legislature and the 
governor, can turn their attention to post-crisis, structural programs that 
would grow the city’s tax base and allow it to return to prosperity over 
time.
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Introduction
In March 2013, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder delivered a letter to the mayor and the City Council of Detroit stating that he had appoint-ed Kevyn Orr as emergency manager of the city. The governor had, by the stroke of his pen, transferred all political authority in the city 
to Orr (assuming that the appointment was valid). This was the culmi-
nation of a process that found that the city’s finances were untenable and 
that the requirements of a recent state statute providing for such take-
overs had been satisfied. In June, the city, now operating under the Orr 
regime, ceased meeting basic cash flow obligations, and on July 18, the 
emergency manager, purportedly on behalf of the city of Detroit, filed 
for bankruptcy. The filing occurred minutes before the commencement 
of a court hearing that, according to the judge, would have blocked the 
bankruptcy action.1
The public characterization of the bankruptcy filing and the support-
ing documentation make it clear that, through the bankruptcy process, 
the emergency manager has at least two strategic goals in filing and pur-
suing the petition. First, he seeks to transform the retirement and benefits 
systems for city employees to a defined contribution plan, transferring 
financial market risk to employees. It is a form of the thinking behind the 
proposals to privatize Social Security. Second, he seeks to organizational-
ly and politically separate the Water and Sewerage Department’s system, 
which serves more than 3 million people in the city and surrounding 
areas (roughly 40 percent of the population of Michigan), from the city 
government, enabling (a) the department’s revenue to be monetized 
through privatization and/or other means and (b) system employee pen-
sion and healthcare benefits to be separated from the city’s programs.2 
 It is unlikely that either of these actions will actually help the city recover 
from the cash flow crisis or even improve its long-term prospects.
The papers filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan, consistent with public statements to the media, detail 
the tragic long-term decline of the city’s economy, including the loss of 
population and the deterioration of city services. 
There is no doubt that the city has suffered from structural decline and 
that state and city policies have not successfully addressed that decline. 
But that is not the immediate issue in a municipal insolvency. The issue 
is that the cash currently available does not cover the current expenses 
of the city. Structural concerns must be addressed, and this can only be 
accomplished over time. Recounting the past can inform decisions to re-
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build the economic viability of the city. But the following questions frame 
the immediately pertinent issues: Why is the cash shortfall that underlies 
the bankruptcy occurring at this moment, and what can be done to keep 
the city operating?
The balance of this paper will address in detail the major topics associ-
ated with the current cash flow crisis and insolvency of the city of Detroit. 
It will examine assets and liabilities because these have become the focus 
of public discussion, though they are not directly relevant to the insol-
vency. It will then analyze the actual causes of the cash flow crisis and 
the components of cash flow: revenues, operating expenses and legacy 
expenses. 
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Assets and Liabilities
Municipal assets have little relevance to a bankruptcy pro-ceeding. The absolute amount of long-term liabilities is similarly irrelevant. This is different from corporate bankruptcies. The reason for this difference is that corpo-
rations have an enterprise value equal to the value of their assets, less 
the amount of their debt. Corporations can be liquidated and sold. The 
absolute amount of the long-term debt of a corporation directly affects 
its liquidation value. In contrast, a municipality cannot be liquidated or 
sold. The value of individual assets is generally a function of the value 
that they provide the public, not a commercial value. That is why mu-
nicipal bankruptcy and insolvency principles do not contemplate liqui-
dation of the municipality. The amount of long-term debt is a concern 
only because of its cash flow implications. The city’s insolvency results 
from available cash being insufficient to meet cash demands, not from its 
liabilities exceeding its assets.
Nonetheless, the emergency manager has often recited the figure of 
$18 billion in liabilities. As a result, any discussion of the bankruptcy 
must examine the issue of city liabilities in order to introduce rational 
analysis to the public discourse, even though the issue is not directly rel-
evant to the insolvency and bankruptcy. Though the number has become 
symbolic of the city’s cash flow shortfall, it is made up of apples and 
oranges, and (far worse) includes obvious conceptual errors and mis-
characterizations.
A careful analysis of the city’s liabilities is enlightening, demonstrat-
ing the danger of the headline phrase, “Detroit $18 Billion in Debt.” 
Below in Figure 1 is the list of liabilities that are constituent elements of 
the purported $18 billion of city liabilities:
Figure 1. City of Detroit Emergency Manager Claimed Liabilities ($ Million)
On Balance Sheet
General Obligation Bonds and Notes $1,130
Water and Sewer Enterprise Debt 5,840
Pension COPs 1,430
Pension Swap Termination Amount 347
Other Balance Sheet Liabilities 300
Off Balance Sheet
Unfunded Pension (Emergency Manager) 3,500
Unfunded Health Benefits 5,700
Total: $18,244
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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The $18 billion figure is misleading when used in connection with the 
insolvency and bankruptcy in several ways. Foremost is the principle, 
long understood in the law and by financial professionals, that municipal 
insolvency and bankruptcy are issues of cash flow. Unlike in businesses 
or even nonprofit corporations, values of assets and liabilities have very 
little to do with municipal bankruptcy. Under the bankruptcy laws, obli-
gations are adjusted only if and to the extent that it is necessary to allow 
cash flow to be positive for a reasonable period.
In addition, the components of the aggregate $18 billion amount are not 
comparable. Thus, it is misleading to aggregate them, especially since the 
resulting amount understandably seems alarming to the less-informed 
public. Moreover, some of the components are simply misrepresented as 
liabilities of the city. An analysis of these components is included in the 
text box on the following page:
A more in-depth analysis of the asserted city liabilities is set forth in 
Appendix A—City Liabilities Asserted by the Emergency Manager.
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•	 About $1.1 billion of the liabilities asserted 
by the emergency manager is clearly owed 
by the city as general obligation debt. This is 
indisputably a liability of the general budget of 
the city. 
•	 An additional $5.8 billion is debt owed from 
the Water and Sewerage Department, which 
serves in excess of 3 million people all across 
southeastern Michigan (roughly 40 percent 
of the state’s population). The debt is payable 
from the fees charged for that service rather 
than from city resources. This is debt of an 
enterprise that reaches far beyond the city and 
is not a direct obligation of the city’s budget. 
Thus, asserting that the total bond amount is a 
liability of the city is not appropriate. 
•	 The city is obligated to repay $1.4 billion of debt 
associated with its pension funds. The proceeds 
from this borrowing were deposited in a fund 
and invested in securities and other investments 
that generate a return. The excess of this return 
on investments (as estimated) over the interest 
cost of the pension debt (which was the core 
rationale for the pension financing) should be 
a net benefit to the city. While it is a debt of 
the general budget of the city, its relationship 
with the city’s pension funds and with the swap 
transaction described below are complex. 
•	 Another $350 million represents termination 
payments on swaps that may or may not be 
payable and changes over time as market 
interest rates move. The amount of the payment 
is a mathematical function of short-term 
interest rates. Lower interest rates increase 
the amount. This “legacy liability” is really an 
obligation to pay interest and is improperly 
included in the list without explanation. The 
termination payment should also be seen as 
an asserted current liability, but one that may 
be avoidable through negotiation or sensible 
coordinated effort between the city and state to 
avoid its effects.  
•	 An additional component relates to retirement 
benefits for city employees. Much of that 
amount was claimed because the emergency 
manager used a nonstandard set of assumptions 
to estimate what the city will have to contribute 
to these benefits over time. One can debate 
the assumptions for calculating unfunded 
retirement benefit obligations, but the city 
has used assumptions that are aggressive yet 
within conventional bounds and has estimated 
approximately $800 million for pensions. 
While key components of these assumptions 
are omitted, those that are disclosed are clearly 
more conservative than even the assumptions 
used by the emergency manager’s own 
consultant in studies other than the ones issued 
in connection with Detroit. In both cases, the 
amount of the unfunded liability is an estimate. 
The only way to know for certain what the 
contribution must be is to wait 30 years and see. 
•	 Finally, $5.7 billion relates to unfunded 
healthcare costs. This figure appears to come 
from calculations done as a part of the city’s 
financial statements. It is large because 
the assumptions used by the city’s finance 
professionals were unusually conservative. The 
city’s healthcare benefits are far from excessive 
and have even been reduced in recent years. 
C O M P O N E N T S  of  L E G A C Y  L I A B I L I T I E S 
Asserted by the Emergency Manager
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City Revenues & 
the Great Recession
T he finances of the city of Detroit, like any other city, are a function of the economic productivity of its commercial and non-profit enterprises. That is measured by the number of people employed and the aggregate income of the city’s population. Everything, 
from consumer sales to income to be taxed to property values, is directly 
related to productivity and income. Other matters, such as tax collection 
rates, that are stressed in the bankruptcy filing are significant (approx-
imately $131 million in uncollected property taxes in 2011 and $30-45 
million estimated annual income tax non-filing by reverse commuters) 
but do not drive the overall results since a substantial amount of this has 
remained uncollected after recent efforts and may not be collectable in 
the current economic conditions.3 
Detroit’s population has fallen precipitously from a high of nearly 2 
million residents and 14,000 people per square mile, constituting the fifth 
largest city in America during the post-World War II years. At its height, 
almost one-third of the state of Michigan’s population were living within 
its borders.4 In the 2010 census, its population was reported as 714,000.
The number of employed Detroit residents fell by 53 percent from 2000 
to 2012. But half of that decline occurred in a single year, 2008, as the Great 
Recession took hold.5 There is one inescapable fact: The most significant 
proximate cause of the cash flow cliff off of which the city fell was the Great 
Recession. The city’s structural problems amplified the consequences of 
the recession for Detroit. The employment opportunities in the city were 
vulnerable to the economic downturn. And there is little doubt that the 
effect of the recession on the auto industry was particularly damaging to 
the city. In the short term, the effects of depopulation and the decline in 
employment on the city’s financial health could not be avoided. These 
structural problems can be addressed, but the task at hand for political 
leaders at the state and municipal levels is to get beyond the crisis and 
then go to work on the structural weaknesses of the city.
The effect of the Great Recession was particularly damaging to Detroit. 
Comparing the city with St. Louis and Cleveland, the two cities cited as 
comparable by the emergency manager in the bankruptcy filing, makes 
this effect is especially clear. It is illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Non-Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate 2008-20126
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013). Unemployment rate - Not Seasonally Adjusted. 
Retrieved September 23, 2013, from https://www.google.com: http://tinyurl.com/q58wjjb.
Figure 3. City of Detroit Long-term Population Decline
by 2010, Detroit's population was down 61% from its peak of 1.8 million residents in the 1950 
census. Detroit has two decades with more than 20% decline, and one hopeful decade of the 
1990s during which the decline slowed to 7.5%
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The city’s financial condition has been weak for many years. This has, 
among other things, narrowed its fiscal options. However, the Great Re-
cession changed the city’s cash flow dynamics materially, driving the cur-
rent crisis. The long-term future of the city depends entirely on how it 
takes advantage of the general economy’s cyclical recovery that appears 
to be beginning. The short-term cash flow shortfall is an issue that must 
be solved as a precondition to longer-term solutions.
City revenues since the onset of the Great Recession, as set forth in 
Figure 4, complete the story. The decline in revenue over the period since 
the onset of the Great Recession is the major driving force behind the 
current cash flow crisis. The enhancement of revenue is at the core of the 
answer to both the crisis and the long-term structural issues faced by the 
city.
Figure 4. City of Detroit Revenues ($ Millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Muni Income Tax 276.5 240.8 216.5 228.3 233.0 238.7
State Revenue Sharing 249.6 266.6 263.6 239.3 173.3 182.8
Wagering Tax 180.4 173.0 183.3 176.9 181.4 173.0
Property Taxes 155.2 163.7 143.0 182.7 147.8 134.9
Sales & Service Charges 191.3 166.7 154.1 155.0 145.4 120.4
Utility Users and other taxes 73.0 71.5 64.8 64.8 57.1 54.8
Other Revenue 156.9 142.7 134.2 152.4 125.5 93.4
General Fund Reimbursement 34.7 55.7 47.6 32.3 47.6 31.2
Transfers 80.1 82.5 83.8 85.1 85.8 92.8
Total 1,397.7 1,363.2 1,290.9 1,316.8 1,196.9 1,122.0
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between municipal taxes, state rev-
enue sharing and other revenue over the period.
Thus, while cash flow outlays decreased by $356.3 million (described 
in detail below in “City Operating Expenses”), revenue decreased by 
$275.7 million. It is clear that the controllable budgetary expenditures 
could not be cut fast enough or deep enough to keep up with the loss in 
revenue.
Again, further analysis of the revenues outlined above is useful and is 
described in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. City of Detroit Components of Revenues ($ Millions)
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Figure 6. City of Detroit Revenue Analysis ($ Millions)
% Decrease Absolute Decrease Absolute Decrease 
as % of Total Decrease
Muni Income Tax 14% 37.8 14%
State Revenue Sharing 27% 66.8 24%
Wagering Tax 4% 7.4 3%
Property Taxes 13% 20.3 7%
Sales & Service Charges 37% 70.9 26%
Utility Users and other taxes 25% 18.2 7%
Other Revenue 40% 63.5 23%
General Fund Reimbursement 10% 3.5 1%
Transfers -16% -12.7 -5%
Total 20% 275.7          100%
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
S TAT E  R E V E N U E 
S H A R E  C U T 
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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The detailed components included in Other Revenue are not clear 
from the city’s financial reports. However, it specifically includes funds 
from the federal government and from a number of city activities. 
The other large line items are Sales and Service Charges and State Rev-
enue Sharing. Sales and Service Charges includes utilities payments that 
are closely related to the economic downturn. State Revenue Sharing is 
another matter. It fell off precipitously commencing in 2011, dropping 
by almost 28 percent from 2010, which accounted for the entire decline 
over the period. 
The critical period in terms of the bankruptcy includes fiscal years 
2011 through 2013. Figure 7 provides a revenue comparison for these 
years.
Figure 8 illustrates the relationship among the components of the rev-
enue decline during the Great Recession.
Figure 8. City of Detroit Relationship Among Components of Revenue Loss
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Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
Figure 7. City of Detroit FY 2011-2013 Revenue Analysis
% Decrease
Absolute 
Decrease  ($ 
Millions)
Absolute Decrease 
as % of Total 
Decrease
Muni Income Tax -4% -10.4 -5%
State Revenue Sharing 31% 56.5 29%
Wagering Tax 2% 3.9 2%
Property Taxes 35% 47.8 25%
Sales & Service Charges 29% 34.6 18%
Utility Users and other taxes 18% 10.0 5%
Other Revenue 63% 59.0 30%
General Fund Reimbursement 4% 1.1 1%
Transfers -8% -7.7 -4%
Total 17% 194.8 100%
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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This revenue decline of almost $200 million over an exceedingly short 
period proved to be devastating. Its size must be compared with the 
$887.5 million of operating expenditures in FY 2011 and the $692.0 mil-
lion of operating expenditures in FY 2013 (see “City Operating Expens-
es,” below). These were the controllable expenditures that had to absorb 
the revenue loss.
Thirty percent of the decline is in Other Revenue, which includes 
available excess revenue from the Water and Sewerage Department, and 
excess revenue from running the department accrues to the city. This 
enterprise serves Detroit and an extensive geographical area around the 
city. During 2011 and 2012, the city issued more than $1.16 billion of 
bonds for its water and sewer enterprise. Approximately half of this debt 
was issued to fund $547 million in swap termination payments on finan-
cial deals that had been terminated by financial institutions because of a 
credit rating downgrade of the city. Undoubtedly, debt service increases 
and revenue declines due to poor economic performance contributed to 
this decline in “Other Revenue” for the city.
Reduced property tax revenues accounted for 25 percent of the post-
2008 decline. The collapse of the housing market hit the city hard. Prop-
erty tax valuations have dropped by approximately 12 percent since the 
collapse in 2008, as illustrated by Figure 9 (a chart reproduced from the 
city’s FY 2012 financial statements). In addition, the skyrocketing unem-
ployment affected incomes dramatically, leading to a decline in collec-
tions.
Figure 9. City of Detroit Assessed and Taxable Value of Residential Property ($ Thousands)
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Lowered state revenue sharing represents 29 percent of the decline. 
This was particularly devastating to the city from a cash flow perspective 
since it occurred in FYs 2011 and 2012 rather than over a period of years. 
There are two components of state revenue sharing. One is based on a 
Michigan Constitution requirement that a portion of the proceeds of a 4 
percent (of the 6 percent) state sales tax be made available for distribu-
tion to cities and towns. Fifteen percent of these proceeds is distributed 
among the cities and towns based on population. Detroit’s share of this 
constitutionally required sum declined after the 2010 census by approxi-
mately $24 million.
Additional state revenue sharing is mandated by statute. This statute 
was amended in 2011 for the period beginning in FY 2012. Because of 
this action of the Michigan Legislature and the governor, Detroit’s state 
revenue sharing declined by an additional $43 million in FY 2012. This is 
qualitatively different from other components of revenue decline, since, 
unlike revenue declines because of the Great Recession and population 
reduction, this loss was based on policy decisions at a time when the city 
was particularly vulnerable to a cash flow crisis.
Emergency revenue enhancement from the state is not part of the 
emergency manager’s plan. The emergency manager has two primary 
proposals relating to revenue. The first is to address uncollected taxes 
owed to the city. The City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing indicates that up 
to $131 million in property taxes due to the city were unpaid in FY 2011. 
Efforts have been underway since 2011 to recover all or a portion of that 
amount. Further, income taxes owed by non-filers are estimated at $250 
million in aggregate. Approximately $30-45 million per year is owed by 
reverse commuter non-filers. Efforts to collect these amounts have been 
underway for some time. The amount that can be recovered from unpaid 
taxes is unknown, but efforts to date have had modest results.
The emergency manager has also proposed to generate unrestricted 
revenue from the Water and Sewerage enterprise. The proposal would 
either privatize elements of the system, transfer the system to a new gov-
ernmental entity or both. In exchange, the city would receive a stream of 
payments that, according to the City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing, would 
be unrestricted. However, the basic enterprise structure would remain 
in place. Water and Sewerage usage fees would be used to make debt 
service payments and (in the case of privatization) pay back private in-
vestment. By creating a separate governmental entity or privatizing, the 
payments to the city would be free of encumbrances placed on it by the 
city, but it would be encumbered by the debt and other obligations of the 
new owner. This would change nothing. Any upfront payments to the 
city would simply increase the debt (and private investment) taken on to 
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finance the payments.
The other major change that is referenced in the proposal to monetize 
and/or privatize the Water and Sewerage system enterprise is a conver-
sion of the pension plan and the health benefit plan for the employees of 
the system. The city would be relieved of its legacy funding obligations 
and they would be assumed by the new owner, which would then convert 
the pension plan to an unspecified new one and would consider the dis-
continuance of health benefits. This element of the Water and Sewerage 
restructuring proposal may have significant effects that may exceed the 
recapitalization proposal significantly.
Another important issue, not considered by the emergency manager, 
is the possibility that the extensive subsidies in the form of city tax ex-
penditures to incentivize downtown development in fact caused the city 
to forego revenue it otherwise would have received. The total amount 
of these tax benefits is significant. The Detroit Economic Development 
Council reports in excess of $20 million per year of tax expenditures 
awarded to enterprises such as the Detroit Medical Center, DTE Energy, 
Comerica Bank, Rock Ventures/Garbsman, the Farbman Group, Com-
puware, and Quicken Loans.8 The effectiveness of such incentive pro-
grams is an area of great controversy.9 Even the most effective tax in-
centive development programs are blunt instruments. To the extent that 
the development would have occurred without these tax expenditures, or 
with less tax expenditure, the program was a burden on city revenue at a 
time when it was particularly damaging.
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City Operating Expenses
A s shown by the following data in Figure 10, the city of De-troit’s payroll is not markedly different from comparable cities, such as St. Louis and Cleveland, the two cities used by the emergency manager for comparison.
 
The data clearly indicate that the city of Detroit has a significantly smaller 
workforce per capita than comparable cities. While the Detroit’s payroll 
per capita is relatively small, the average salary is slightly larger. This is 
undoubtedly because the reduction in the number of city employees has 
affected lower-paid jobs slightly more. 
The city responded to the effects of the Great Recession by reducing 
expenses. This included expenses related to salaries and operations, as 
shown in Figure 11.
Figure 10.  City of Detroit Employee and Payroll Comparables10
Detroit St. Louis Cleveland
Payroll $651,437,244 $300,266,820 $425,029,356
Employees per Capita 1/61 1/50 1/50
Average Salary $56,491 $47,566 $54,929
Payroll per Capita $912.66 $940.41 $1,071.10
 The employee and payroll comparables: Rosiak, L. (2013, July 22). EXography: 19 U.S. Cities Have Proportionately 
Bigger Workforces than Bankrupted Detroit. Washington Examiner. Retrieved September 22, 2013, from http://wash-
ingtonexaminer.com/exography-19-u.s.-cities-have-proportionately-bigger-workforces-than-bankrupted-detroit/arti-
cle/2533338#list2308200400
Figure 11. City of Detroit Municipal Salaries and Operating Expenses
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The city administration has obviously taken extraordinary steps to 
mitigate the cash flow squeeze that occurred after the onset of the Great 
Recession by reducing expenditures that could be readily controlled. 
More than 2,350 jobs have been lost, coming on the heels of large job 
cuts before the recession started. This explains much, though not all, of 
the deficiency in services currently provided by the city, which has been 
highlighted in the press and in the emergency manager’s bankruptcy 
filing. 
Undoubtedly, this level of operations is a long-term drag on the pros-
perity of the city. The city’s bankruptcy proceeding documents, filed by 
the emergency manager, make this clear. The kinds of initiatives recently 
proposed by the federal government are promising remedies for these 
problems,11 but the improvement of city services is a threshold issue for 
structural recovery. There is also little doubt that the reduction of the 
“controllable” operating budget cannot be a remedy for the cash flow 
crisis the city is currently experiencing.
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City Legacy Expenses
The other cash demands on the city are referred to in the bank-ruptcy filings as ongoing “legacy expenses.” Legacy expenses are the cash flow consequences of “legacy liabilities.” Unlike legacy liabilities, they are pertinent to the cash flow crises and its rem-
edies. They include principal and interest payments on bonds issued by 
the city, payments in respect of derivatives, and future liabilities to pay 
pension and healthcare benefits for employees. In contrast with the city’s 
operating expenses, these amounts, set forth in Figures 12 and 13, have 
increased rather than declined since the onset of the Great Recession.
Figure 12. City of Detroit Legacy Expenses ($ Millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bond Debt Service 133.8 177.6 135.9 137.3 135.6 141.4
Certificates of Participation 29.8 25.1 28.1 38.9 39.0 55.4
COP Swaps 45.3 49.9 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.6
Total Financial 208.9 252.6 214.7 226.9 225.3 247.4
Pension Contribution 76.3 65.7 50.8 119.5 86.1 78.3
Health Benefits 129.3 143.7 132.3 139.7 150.1 151.6
Total Benefits 205.6 209.4 183.1 259.2 236.2 229.9
Total Legacy      414.5   462.0 397.8 486.1 461.5 477.3
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
Figure 13. City of Detroit Total Expenses
0
200
600
1,000
1,400
400
800
1,200
1,600
1,800
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total Operating
Total Legacy
25  •  T H E  D E T R O I T  B A N K R U P T C Y
Therefore, total annual expenditures, both operating and legacy, de-
clined by $356.3 million over the period, while legacy expenditures in-
creased by $62.8 million. The percentage of the increase in legacy ex-
penditures attributable to financing costs was 61.3 percent and that the 
percentage related to benefits was 38.7 percent. It should be noted that, 
because the Water and Sewerage enterprise revenue is reported net of 
debt service, the increase in financing costs of those enterprises, and in 
particular the debt service on bonds issued to finance the half-billion 
dollars of termination payments on swaps, is not included in the legacy 
expenses. Of the increase in benefits, almost all related to healthcare, not 
pensions.
Of particular note is a further analysis of these legacy expenses de-
scribed in Figure 14.
This analysis tells us that the largest increase was the cash flow demand 
from the Certificates of Participation (“COPs”) transaction. Further, it 
tells us that the increase in benefits expenses was virtually all associated 
with health benefits. The nationwide annual increase in healthcare costs 
of 4 percent per year, if compounded over the period, would indicate an 
increase over five years of 21 percent, less than the 17 percent increase 
(which is a 3.25 percent annual increase) reported for the city.12 Future 
healthcare costs may be relatively lower as a result of the Affordable Care 
Act.
The significant increase in the cash flow demands of the COPs transac-
tions is partly attributable to principal repayment kicking in. In addition, 
an increase of $800,000 per year represents additional payments made 
in a 2009 settlement to avoid the consequences of the first termination 
event on the COPs-related swaps resulting from the credit rating down-
grade of the city. The COPs financing and the related swap transaction 
are discussed in great detail below. (The second termination event, which 
was asserted based on the events of 2013 and could result in a payment of 
Figure 14. City of Detroit Legacy Expenses ($ Million)
% Increase 2008-113 Absolute Increase 2008-13
Debt Service 6% 7.6
COPs 86% 25.6
COP Swaps 12% 5.3
Total Financial 18% 38.5
Pension Contribution 3% 2.0
Health Benefits 17% 22.3
Total Benefits 12% 24.3
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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$350 million to terminate the swaps, has not yet been resolved and is not 
reflected in these figures.)
C O P S  T R A N S A C T I O N  A N D  S WA P  PAYM E N T S
The city’s current circumstances cannot be fully understood without 
a thorough analysis of the pension fund financing and the related deriv-
atives transactions entered into prior to the financial crisis and the onset 
of the Great Recession.
The COPs. 
The pension financing was designed to fund the city’s pension con-
tribution obligations, and many state and local governments have done 
such financings. The rationale was that the obligations on the debt would 
replace the city’s pension funding obligation. The cash proceeds would be 
invested by the pension fund, and the city would make more on the in-
vestments than it would pay in interest. Half the debt was fixed rate, and 
half was floating but was converted synthetically to fixed via the swaps.
The pension fund debt was structured as certificates of participation or 
COPs, which raises significant concerns about whether they were legally 
authorized.13 Structurally, the city could have issued general obligation 
bonds payable from its general fund to raise the amounts borrowed in 
the pension financing. Instead, the city used a complex financial struc-
ture, in part to get around debt restrictions. A cash stream was generated 
by payments under contracts entered into by the city for no substantive 
reason other than to generate the payment stream. Then investors were 
sold participations in the cash stream.
•	 Special purpose nonprofit companies were formed for both 
the general pension funds and the police and fire funds. The 
nonprofits entered into a contract with the city under which 
they performed specified administrative duties, and the city 
agreed to compensate them. The compensation payments 
were in an amount that was equal to principal and interest on 
debt in the amount raised in the COPs transaction. 
•	 The investors did not get conventional bonds. They got 
certificates that entitled them to a pro rata participation in 
the stream of cash paid by the city under the contracts with 
the pension fund nonprofit corporations. The share of the 
stream of cash representing an investor’s participation was 
pro rata with the investor’s share of the total amount paid for 
the COPs by all investors.
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•	 Thus, the instruments bought by investors generated cash 
as if they were conventional bonds. However, the city paid 
under a service contract rather than straightforwardly 
making payments on bonds. Since its obligations were 
under a service contract, the city did not comply with legal 
requirements governing the issuance of bonds.
It appears that the COPs structure was used to avoid limitations on 
debt, such as voter approval of the transaction and legal limits on debt, 
that would have applied had the conventional general obligation bond 
been used. 
The Swaps.
 It is important to note that $800 million of the debt carried a floating 
interest rate and was immediately converted synthetically to fixed interest 
rates using derivatives. These derivatives transactions were in the form of 
interest rate swaps in which the city paid counterparties a fixed amount 
based on the city’s then-current borrowing rate on long-term debt. The 
city received amounts in return that were calculated based on prevail-
ing floating rates over time on a notional (or assumed) principal amount 
of debt. Simultaneously, the city borrowed in the bond markets issuing 
floating rate debt in a principal amount equal to the notional principal 
amount on which the swaps were based. The floating rate payments were 
used to pay interest on the actual floating rate debt, leaving the city obli-
gated to make the fixed payments under the swaps.14 The net effect was 
that the city’s cash flow was used to make synthetic fixed rate debt pay-
ments. This was done because the city believed, based on advice, that the 
overall result would be better than straightforwardly issuing long-term 
fixed-rate debt. The city was told that the market for floating rate debt was 
relatively favorable.
The counterparties to the city on the swaps were banks and other finan-
cial entities. However, under the original swap documents, bond insur-
ers guaranteed the fixed rate payments by the city to the counterparties 
under the pension financing swaps. On default or if there was any other 
termination, the insurers stepped into the shoes of the counterparties 
and controlled the proceedings under the documents. The pension swaps 
were subject to termination if the city suffered a credit rating downgrade 
or if an emergency manager was appointed, and if the city missed a pay-
ment, all of which happened. In that event, the counterparties were enti-
tled to an immediate payment of projected future profits (i.e., the excess 
of the fixed payments by the city over the reduction in floating payments 
by the counterparties since inception of the swap, with the floating rate 
assumed to continue at the floating rate applicable at the time of the ter-
mination, “present-valued” based on a discount rate). 
When the termination was claimed, this termination amount was very 
large. That was because (a) lower short-term interest rates mathemati-
cally increased projected profits, and (b) short-term rates had been kept 
extraordinarily low by the Federal Reserve to counteract the recession. 
The termination payment was avoided when the first termination was 
threatened through restructuring in 2009 by increasing city payments 
and providing more collateral. The second termination event in 2013, as 
a result of the emergency manager appointment and the insolvency, is 
reported to require an immediate payment of up to $350 million under 
the swap documents.
Many tens of billions of dollars of taxable pension fund debt transac-
tions tied with swaps have been entered into by states and municipalities 
in the last 20 years. They have been severely criticized as vehicles for price 
gouging by banks that underwrite the bond debt and provide the swaps.15 
It has been asserted that the use of long-term floating rate debt and float-
ing to fixed rate swaps (the structure used in Detroit and in other state 
and municipal pension financings) in the corporate taxable market is ex-
tremely rare.16
But even more concerning is the objective imprudence of this swap 
transaction. The banks and insurance companies involved in this trans-
action had a moral and possibly legal obligation to explain its embedded 
risks to the city and to make certain that the city and the public under-
stood those risks. And even if they did explain the risks, they also had an 
overriding moral obligation to refuse to do the transaction since it was so 
imprudent. The circumstances of the Detroit pension swap transactions 
were so extreme that they clearly amounted to unconscionable behavior. 
A court can determine whether the moral obligation was also a legal one.
Observations on the Financing.
There are factors related to the pension financing swaps that are partic-
ularly concerning. The only reason for doing floating rate debt swapped 
to fixed is that it is cheaper than issuing the debt fixed rate. First, an anal-
ysis of a portion of the documentation indicates that the total cost of the 
floating rate COPs and the accompanying swaps that fixed the interest 
rate may have been as much as 0.50 percent per year more costly than the 
fixed rate COPs. The cash value, at the time of the issuance of the COPs, 
of an overpayment of 0.50 percent per year would be approximately $14 
million, a significant sum that calls for explanation. Perhaps the city was 
told that it needed to access the floating rate bond market in order to 
take on more debt. In other words, the city may have been told that the 
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market for fixed rate taxable debt of the city at a comparable fixed interest 
rate was tapped out. This would explain the decision to do half fixed and 
floating-swapped-to-fixed. The need to fix the floating interest rate syn-
thetically using swaps bought the city tremendous risk that was realized 
when the Great Recession hit and again when the emergency manager 
was appointed and payments were missed.
In addition, the city’s counterparty on certain of the pension swaps 
was a small firm from Ohio, called SBS Financial, reportedly backed by 
Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. This unusual arrangement calls out 
for further inquiry, especially as it might relate to advisers to the city 
on the swaps. (Locally based advisers to municipal governments often 
have close relationships with regional financial firms. In the past, these 
relationships have been shown to influence the advice provided by mu-
nicipal advisors.) This is particularly concerning because Sean Werdlow, 
Detroit’s Chief Financial Officer at the time of the initial COPs financing, 
reportedly assumed a position at SBS in November 2005, five months 
after the deal closed.17 Given the significance of the COPs and related 
swap transactions, this should be discussed and, if warranted, pursued.
 These factors raise questions: Why was the floating COP/swap struc-
ture used, and why was it probably more expensive? It was certainly 
riskier than a conventional fixed rate bond issue, especially for Detroit. 
There are several possible explanations, but those that are superficially 
legitimate may or may not be true or complete. The recurrence of mu-
nicipalities being ill-informed of the risks in complex swap transactions 
throughout the country in recent years suggests that these unusual ar-
rangements should be examined in detail, especially given the large ter-
mination payments now claimed.
These risks may not have been self-evident to the city finance profes-
sionals and decision-makers. Superficially, assuming that the compari-
son of fixed rate bonds against floating rate bonds swapped to fixed was 
accurate, there was little risk. Cash flows for floating interest payments 
and floating swap receipts were roughly matched. However, the risks as-
sociated with swaps go far beyond that simple comparison. Swaps are 
long-term executory contracts. The outcome to the city’s counterparties 
is uncertain. These counterparties received fixed payments and pay out 
floating amounts. If short-term, floating rates go down over the life of the 
contract, the counterparty makes more money as the difference between 
the payment streams increases. Swaps also include provisions that allow 
early termination by the financial institutions acting as counterparties. 
One condition in the city’s case was a credit rating reduction below “in-
vestment grade,” the minimum threshold that investors often use. An-
other was the appointment of an emergency manager and nonpayment. 
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In termination, the city’s counterparties would be entitled to full and 
immediate payment of their projected profit that they would have re-
ceived had the swaps remained outstanding for their stated terms. If the 
time remaining on the swaps was many years, and if low short-term rates 
caused the projected profit to be high, this termination payment could 
be very large indeed. However, if short-term floating rates were high, the 
payment might be small or even flow from the counterparty to the city. 
Thus, projected profits go up and down, and possibly go negative, over 
time.
When swap transactions go bad, it is typically because of the floating 
fair value of the swaps. The city remained somewhat balanced over the 
long run in terms of cash flow. But termination required immediate and 
large payments, creating a significant short-term cash flow problem.
In 2005 and 2006, the swaps transactions posed a huge risk to the city. 
The city’s credit rating had hovered on the precipice of noninvestment 
grade for years. Any downgrade could trigger an immediate payment of 
projected profit to the counterparties. One factor that should have been 
considered was the possibility that a general economic downturn could 
lead to a downgrade, and that, in a general economic downturn, the Fed-
eral Reserve could very well drive interest rates to low levels to offset 
the economic contraction of a recession. If this happened, the city could 
be exposed to a termination payment at just the time that the projected 
profits were very high and consequently the termination payment was 
very high. Moreover, if the downgrade occurred, the city would be hard-
pressed to borrow money to cover such a large termination payment. 
The Great Recession precipitated such an event—one that was exceed-
ingly powerful. While anticipating the recession would be unlikely, the 
city and its advisers should have considered the possibility of an event of 
this type. It is hard to imagine an entity for which the risk of a massive 
swap program would have been greater.
This is especially concerning in regard to the overall purpose of the 
pension fund financing. The entire concept is based on investment re-
turns for the proceeds in excess of the cost of the financing. Figure 15 is a 
conceptual representation of the hoped-for results of a pension financing 
like the one that the city did. This involves market risk, but many state 
and local government pension funds have decided that the potential re-
wards of earning investment returns on the proceeds of a debt that was 
higher than the financing cost were worth it. However, Detroit’s position 
was particularly precarious. The city and its advisers should have consid-
ered whether the increment of investment earnings over the cost of the 
debt, assuming that they were earned, was worth the risk of a catastroph-
ic termination event. 
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The initial termination event occurred in FY 2009 as the city lost its in-
vestment grade credit rating. The termination payment would have been 
$450 million at that time. However, the city was not able to issue debt 
to fund the termination payment for the pension swaps because of the 
downgrade. Instead, the city worked out a 2009 settlement in which the 
counterparties increased the fixed payments by $800,000 per year and 
were granted additional security in the form of a lien on wagering tax 
revenues.
This was not an enduring solution. The appointment of the emergen-
cy manager and the cash flow crisis precipitated a second termination 
event, and short-term rates remained low. The current projected profit of 
the counterparties is in the range of $350 million. Any payment of this 
amount would burden the cash flow of the city further.
Unfortunately, the pension financing swap termination payments are 
exceedingly large because of extraordinary interest rate policies result-
ing from the Great Recession. The Federal Reserve has kept short-term 
interest rates very low since the financial crash, attempting to stimulate 
economic and job growth. The termination payments, which compen-
sate the financial institutions that are counterparties to the city for pro-
jected future profits, are tied to short-term interest rates: the lower the 
prevailing short-term rate, the higher the payments. Ironically, the short-
term interest rates have been relatively ineffectual in creating jobs, which 
would have benefited the city, but instead they have been a source of tre-
mendous profit for the financial institutions that now claim the termina-
tion payments.
The Federal Reserve has kept them low, trying to stimulate economic 
growth, using extraordinary and unprecedented methods. As a result, the 
projected profits of the counterparties and the termination payment are 
very high. It is highly unlikely that this condition will persist. This is a 
very unusual circumstance in the financial markets, in that short-term 
rates are being affected strongly by aggressive Federal Reserve interven-
tion. The termination payment would be lowered by an increase in short-
term interest rates. It would be zero if LIBOR (the short term interest 
rate index used to calculate swap payments) increased by 2.75 percentage 
points and would turn positive for the city if rates increased further. It 
Figure 15. Conceptual Model of a Pension Fund Financing
Debt Interest Cost @ 5.75% 
for 15 Years
Investment Return on 
Proceeds @ 8% for 15 Years
Excess of Investment 
Returns over Interest Cost
$1.5 billion $1.294 billion $1.746 billion $451.6 million
Source: Demos Analysis
is perfectly logical to conclude that the probability of higher rates in the 
future is much greater than the probability of lower rates. Under these 
circumstances, paying the termination payment today could inflict cash 
flow burdens on the city that it need not experience if the swaps were kept 
outstanding.
In summary, reported current legacy expenses, which do not include 
any pension fund swap termination payments, are neither the cause of 
the cash shortfall nor an obvious solution. For example, the COPs’ debt 
service, together with the pre-termination swap payments received and 
paid, result in relatively stable fixed rate payments. The COPs swap ter-
mination payment is a different issue. Any termination payment must be 
funded by a borrowing. Reportedly, the emergency manager is focused 
on additional debt funding of this termination payment backed by wa-
gering tax revenues, but the net result of that would be a significant re-
duction in city revenues. Even in the best case, a full payment of the ter-
mination payment could reduce available cash flow if the terms of debt 
issued to fund the payment are harsh, a burden the city should not have 
to bear. Worse, the city would be exposed to floating interest payments 
on the floating rate COPs that would no longer be synthetically fixed by 
the swaps. 
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Conclusions
T he city of Detroit is experiencing a cash flow crisis that has re-sulted in the appointment of an emergency manager who has assumed virtually all authority over the city’s affairs. It has been the basis for the filing of the largest municipal bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in history. The city faces two major tasks, which are related but 
must be distinguished: It must overcome the current cash flow crisis to 
resume its political function, and it must address structural problems 
that have plagued it for years so it can once again be a vital and growing 
community. The second task will take years, and the current crisis must 
be resolved quickly.
The emergency manager has conflated the two tasks. The City of De-
troit Bankruptcy Filing, among other things, calls for a conversion of the 
city’s pension system to a defined contribution plan from a defined ben-
efits plan; the privatization or other monetization of portions of the re-
gional Water and Sewerage system; and several other long-term changes 
to the structure of the city’s operations and management. 
The emergency manager has focused on the expenses of the city as he 
seeks solutions to the crisis. In particular, he has identified the pension 
system for city workers. Operating expenses and employee benefits were 
not the causes of the current cash flow crisis. In fact, the city’s operat-
ing expenses have become so low after a period of extensive cuts that 
they threaten viability. Pension and healthcare benefits are modest, and 
it would be counterproductive to cut them. As described above, especial-
ly given the modest levels of benefits and salaries, the improvement to 
the services provided by the city that is need for resolution of long-term 
structural issues (and that the emergency manager endorses in the city of 
Detroit Bankruptcy Filing and in other pronouncements) would be ham-
pered by these actions. Employees would be more difficult to retain and 
to attract. The focus on these elements of the city’s cash flow is misguided 
and distracts from the real problems behind the cash flow crisis.
The emergency manager has also targeted the privatization or other 
monetization of the regional Water and Sewerage Department. This is no 
more than a form of borrowing; any investment must be paid back from 
the Water and Sewerage revenues from user fees. The more substantive 
change is a transfer of functions and jobs to the private sector or to a new 
public owner that has a predisposition to reduce employee wages and 
benefits, an ideological goal that is a distraction from solving the current 
crisis. The privatization and/or monetization of the Water and Sewerage 
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Department is clearly a matter of policy. The system serves approximately 
3 million people, about 40 percent of the population of Michigan. Detroit 
represents about one-quarter of this service population. The decision to 
monetize public assets is a form of financing; what is received through 
monetization must be paid back through fees paid by the public. But it 
also has implications in terms of public sector workers. The primary dif-
ference is that employee benefits will be reduced and public sector work-
ers will be fewer because the public sector is shrunk. These are matters 
that will have little if any impact on the cash flow shortfall.
It is abundantly clear that the source of the cash flow crisis is a tre-
mendous decline in revenue. The city was damaged heavily by the Great 
Recession, with substantial decline in employment and property values. 
This caused a substantial drop in tax and other revenue in the first years 
after the 2008 crash, which has persisted to this day.
The tipping point was reached when annual state revenue sharing was 
cut by $67 million per year in two stages, in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. 
Much of these cuts directly resulted from the acts of the state Legislature 
and the governor. Thus, the state was an active player in the events lead-
ing to the cash flow crisis. The state has a moral duty to participate in the 
resolution of the crisis substantively, far beyond the appointment of the 
emergency manager and the filing for bankruptcy. The state must be a 
source of financial support and enhancement of revenue for the city. In 
effect, the state reduced pressures on its budget by cutting revenue shar-
ing, and then put the city into bankruptcy to abrogate the consequences 
of its actions. To allow this to stand sets a dangerous precedent and would 
condone a significant moral hazard for the future.
The large cuts to the entire operating budget, and in particular the re-
duction in workforce, objectively indicate that the city has exhausted all 
significant means for cutting operating expenses. It is in the interest of 
the state to help increase revenue for the city over the short term and 
to collaborate on enhancing the city’s revenue base over the long term. 
Immediate action should include the reversal of all or a part of the cut 
in state revenue sharing. A reasonable goal is to increase city revenues 
immediately by up to $198 million, generating a reasonable cash flow 
for the current fiscal year that works on that basis. Post-crisis, structural 
programs to grow the city’s tax base can be implemented prudently over 
time.
The public pronouncements of the emergency manager and the direc-
tion of the bankruptcy filing are inconsistent with these principles. The 
dual focus on the restructuring of public employee contracts and retire-
ment and health benefits, and the privatization and/or monetization of 
the Water and Sewerage Department, given objective circumstances, (as 
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described above under “City Revenues and the Great Recession”) would 
not substantively improve the city’s cash flow or long-term financial 
health. The focus is, simply stated, misdirected.
T H E  WAY  F O R WA R D
The emergency manager should pursue courses of action that are very 
different from those he is engaged in now. These include the following:
•	 Immediate revenue enhancement in order to address the 
cash flow shortfall at its source must be pursued. This means 
enlisting state involvement on an emergency basis. The goal 
should be to increase cash flow to the city by $198 million per 
year to bridge the gap until structural programs can be put 
in place and the city can benefit from any increased general 
economic improvement. Restoration of state revenue sharing 
would be a good starting point. 
•	 The proposed structural changes to the pension funds should 
be dropped. City contributions were not the cause of the 
crisis. Conversion of the system to a defined contribution plan 
or reduction of vested benefits from currently modest levels 
would be counterproductive as the city seeks to retain and 
add employees as it recovers in the years ahead. Importantly, 
such a conversion under the circumstances would also 
adversely affect the financial dynamics of a system with 
few active employees supporting a stable number of vested 
beneficiaries at a time when the city will likely be adding new 
active employees as the recovery progresses. 
•	 Privatization or other monetization of the Water and 
Sewerage Department should be dropped. The city is only a 
part of this system. Moreover, the asserted benefits of such a 
plan are not likely to be realized.  
•	 The emergency manager’s plan to pay the swap termination 
fees outside the bankruptcy process should be abandoned.  
The swap counterparties should be made to bear the 
consequences of the original swap transaction and should 
be pushed to forego their projected profit as a result of the 
unusually large profit they have already been able to make 
on these deals as a result of historically low interest rates 
caused by the financial crisis. The State should be enlisted to 
guarantee the swaps to avoid termination payments, if necessary. 
The termination fees will become smaller as interest rates rise 
over time, which they are likely to do. The suggestion that the 
city would settle for a payment of 70-80 percent of the claimed 
amount is an extraordinarily poor result given the objective 
circumstances of the original swap transaction.  
•	 The insurers on the COP swaps were likely paid a premium 
based on the projected payments to be insured over the life of 
the financing. If there is a termination, the period that the debt is 
outstanding is made shorter. It is analogous to a long-term, fixed 
rate bond transaction that is refunded before maturity. In that 
situation, the insurance premium is often rebated. The insurance 
premium associated with the fixed rate payments under the 
swaps should be prorated and rebated to the city if the swaps are 
terminated. This could be as high as $14.5 million. 
•	 The holders of the certificates of participation must be engaged 
directly in restructuring of obligations. The emergency manager 
should exert leverage over the COPs holders by suggesting 
that the transaction may have been unauthorized by law. The 
emergency manager should assert that the COPs were, ultra 
vires, beyond the authority of the city to transact and void or 
voidable. Even though the investors and the city must have been 
comfortable with the legality of the transaction at the time, 
circumstances are different now; a fresh look by the courts might 
be helpful to encourage a restructuring of the COPs transaction, 
if for no other reason. Their rights are arguably less sacred than 
those of the other obligees of the city. So far, the city’s employees 
have borne the major share of the consequences of the massive 
post-2008 revenue decline because they were more vulnerable. 
With the filing of the bankruptcy petition, there is no longer a 
reason to avoid an aggressive approach to restructuring of these 
financial obligations. 
•	 Tax expenditures to incentivize investment should be reclaimed. 
The citizens of Detroit have already suffered as a result of 
the crisis, as have the public employees. The recipients of tax 
expenditures should participate as well.
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Appendix
An Analysis of City Liabilities Asserted
by the Emergency Manager
F I N A N C I A L  D E B T
The following Figure A-1. is a summary of the financial debt of the city 
of Detroit as of June 30, 2012. The amount of debt per capita is included 
to provide scale to the figures presented, which is particularly pertinent 
to the discussion of the Water and Sewerage Department debt that fol-
lows.
The emergency manager presents this debt as if it were analytically all 
the same type of debt. In reality, it is very different. The only debt that is 
accurately and completely represented is the general obligation debt, rep-
resenting only $1,651 per capita, a very manageable amount.
R E V E N U E  D E B T 
This debt, totaling approximately $5.84 billion, is payable exclusively 
from the revenues generated by the enterprises for which it was raised. 
It is not payable from the general funds of the city. These enterprises are 
meant to liquidate the debt over time. This debt should be ignored for the 
purpose of analyzing the city’s financial health. 
In fact, the cash flow statements filed as part of the bankruptcy pro-
Figure A-1. City of Detroit Bonds, Notes and Loans as of FY End 2013
Amount Amt. per capita
Unlimited Tax General Obligation Bonds 469,100,000 685.02
Limited Tax General Obligation Bonds 540,300,000 788.99
General Obligation Notes and Loans 121,500,000 177.42
Total GO Debt 1,130,900,000 1,651.43
Sewage Disposal Revenue Bonds 2,820,000,000 4,118.00
Sewage Disposal Revenue State Loans 472,800,000 690.42
Total Sewage Revenue Debt 3,292,800,000 4,808.42
Water System Revenue Bonds 2,520,000,000 3,679.91
Water System Revenue State Loans 21,400,000 31.25
Total Water System Revenue Debt 2,541,400,000 3,711.16
Total Sewage/Water Revenue Debt 5,834,200,000 8,519.58
Parking Revenue Bonds 9,300,000 13.58
Total Revenue Debt 5,843,500,000 8,533.16
Pension Certificates of Participation 1,451,905,000 2,120.19
Source: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing
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ceedings do just that. They do not include gross Water and Sewerage fees 
in revenues, and they do not include principal and interest payments on 
the Water and Sewerage revenue debt in city debt service. The Water and 
Sewerage enterprises appear in these cash flows as the revenues net of 
both the department’s operating expenses and the principal and interest 
payments on the its revenue debt. Thus, including the Water and Sewer-
age revenue bonds as debt of the city general fund distorts the financial 
condition of the city.
Even if the Water and Sewerage revenue bonds were properly charac-
terized as city debt, ignoring the central fact that they are paid from user 
fees, the implications of this are significant. If all these revenue bonds 
were allocable to the city, the amount of that debt would be $8,529 per 
capita. But the Water and Sewerage Department serves more than 3 mil-
lion people, only 714,000 of whom reside in the city. Allocating the debt 
on a population basis, it represents $1,974 per capita, compared with the 
general obligation debt.
C E R T I F I C AT E S  O F  PA R T I C I PAT I O N 
The COPs represent amounts borrowed in 2005 and 2006 to raise 
money to be deposited into the pension fund to cover unfunded contri-
butions. The city exchanged pension funding obligations over time for 
debt service on the COPs. Fundamentally, if the investment income on 
the cash generated by the COPs exceeds the interest cost of the COPs, 
this excess would mean that the obligation to repay principal, net of the 
excess, would be lower than the pension fund contributions. 
Eight hundred million dollars of the $1.6 billion COPs bear interest 
at a floating rate. Interest (both fixed and floating) was subject to federal 
income tax on receipt by the holders of the COPs, since raising money to 
fund a pension fund is not a permissible purpose for tax-exempt bonds. 
The city elected to enter into LIBOR-based swaps to offset the floating 
rate exposure. The city entered into $800 million notional amount (i.e., 
the assumed principal amount to which the interest rates in the swaps 
are applied) of swaps under which the city receives payments to offset 
the floating interest cost on the COPs and pays a fixed payment equal to 
a notional fixed interest rate on the notional amount of the swaps. There-
fore, on a net basis, the city’s basic COPs/swap obligation is as if the $800 
million of floating rate COPs bore interest at a fixed rate as reflected in 
the swaps.18
The emergency manager represents that the swaps have a “negative 
fair value” to the city of $343.6 million as of May 31, 2013. The cash 
flow statements show a negative fair value of $439.3 million as of June 
30, 2012. The reason for this difference is that the negative fair value is 
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mathematically related to short-term interest rates expressed as LIBOR (the 
London Interbank Offered Rate, which is commonly used as a floating rate 
index). As LIBOR increases, the negative fair value decreases; and as LIBOR 
decreases, the negative fair value increases. The fair value is zero when the 
market value of a swap having those terms is zero, as it presumably was when 
the swaps were entered into.
The overall economic effect of the swaps is that the city has synthetical-
ly secured a net fixed interest rate on $800 million of the COPs. However, 
the city secured this with extremely long-term swaps (maturing in 2029 and 
2034). From the time the swaps were executed in 2006 until today, the value 
(to the banks that are counterparties to the city) of the city’s future perfor-
mance under the swaps has increased. This is because the expected differ-
ence between the fixed payments and the floating payments has grown as 
short-term interest rates plummeted after the financial crisis and the Federal 
Reserve intervention to stimulate growth. This “negative fair value” can de-
crease or turn into a positive value if interest rates rise. The current steepness 
of the LIBOR rate curve (based on one-month LIBOR, six-month LIBOR, 
one-year LIBOR and so on) has been increasing, indicating a market view 
that LIBOR is likely to increase in the immediate future.19 This means there 
is a general market expectation that LIBOR will increase over time, there-
by reducing the negative fair value of the swaps. Regardless, the underlying 
fixing of the rates on the COPs will be unchanged. The only thing changing 
is the expected future profit that has accrued to the banks. This benefit of the 
bargain will only be realized if the city continues to perform by making its 
fixed payments on the swaps. The termination payment is equal to the banks’ 
expected future profit as of a given date and that amount will change.
The city lost its investment grade rating in FY 2009 after the financial 
crisis kicked in. This credit rating downgrade constituted a termination 
event under the swaps that would have required the city to pay the expected 
future profit as of that date. Instead, the city negotiated to provide addition-
al security for the fixed swap payment obligation in the form of a pledge 
of wagering tax receipts and agreed to an increase of 0.10 percent in the 
notional fixed interest rate used to calculate the fixed swap payments. The 
nonpayment in June 2013 was an additional termination event, as was the 
appointment of the emergency manager in March. Negotiations with the 
bank counterparties on these additional termination events continue, but 
the emergency manager reportedly seeks to settle the payment at 70-80 per-
cent on the dollar.
In addition, the fairness of the original pricing must be considered. It is 
publicly suggested that complex pension funding transactions for munici-
palities have often been wildly mispriced by the banks that managed them.20
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U N F U N D E D  P E N S I O N  L I A B I L I T Y
Perhaps the most controversial element of the emergency manager’s 
legacy obligation calculation is the unfunded pension liability for the two 
categories of city pension funds: that the fund for general city employees 
and that the fund for police officers and firefighters. The aggregate amount 
that has been preliminary calculated, based on the assumptions histori-
cally used by the city of Detroit, is approximately $800 million.21Advisers 
to the emergency manager performed calculations for several scenarios, 
each using different assumptions.22 The scenario chosen by the emergen-
cy manager yielded an unfunded pension liability of $3.5 billion. This 
result has been the basis for the emergency manager’s assertion that the 
city’s pension obligations should be restructured by the bankruptcy court 
and that the entire pension structure should be altered as a remedy to the 
city’s cash flow shortfall.
Deep structural issues are at the core of the city’s obligations related to 
pension benefits. As discussed above, the city’s population has declined 
over decades, from a peak of approximately 2 million to 714,000 as re-
ported in the 2010 census. As a result, the number of active city employ-
ees has also declined, as illustrated in Figures A-2 and A-3 below. This de-
cline has accelerated since the onset of the Great Recession, as the city has 
shrunk its payroll by 30 percent and its workforce by 20 percent. The ratio 
of population to employees has increased to 61-to-1, higher than in com-
parable cities in which the ratio is 50-to-1 (see “Part III—City Operating 
Expenses,” above). During this period of time, the number of retirees and 
beneficiaries in the system has been almost completely unchanged. The 
general retirement plan retirees range from a high of 11,555 to a low of 
11,311, a difference of 2.16 percent. In addition, the ratio of retired em-
ployees to current employees has increased. A recent study finds that the 
percentage of retired workers in the city’s general retirement system has 
increased from 49 percent to 61 percent since 2004.23 (By way of contrast, 
in the Ohio state retirement system, in which Cleveland participates, the 
ratio of retirees to total participants is 53%).24 This trend has been a long-
term phenomenon that accelerated starting in 2004.
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The increase in the percentage of retirees covered with pension bene-
fits is almost 100 percent because of a reduction in the workforce. 
This dynamic is very important given the clear desire by the emergen-
cy manager to convert the pension system to a defined contribution plan 
from a defined benefit plan. Currently, a substantial proportion of future 
benefits has vested. The more employees who contribute to the plan, es-
pecially newer and younger employees, the longer the investment hori-
zon that can be applied to the plan. It is commonly understood that the 
demographics of active workers can be a specific and important factor in 
the overall economics of a defined benefits plan. One of the driving fac-
tors of a plan is its ability to hold investments over a long time horizon, 
Figure A-2. City of Detroit General Retirement Fund - Active and Retired 
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Figure A-3. City of Detroit Police and Fire Retirement Fund - Active and Retired Active Members
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an extraordinarily valuable asset.
Even the emergency manager recognizes that the city’s long-term cir-
cumstances require that services be enhanced. This means that the deficit 
in the number of city employees must be made up, and more employ-
ees must be added. If the defined benefit plan is maintained, the burden 
of the vested benefits will be spread over an increasing time horizon as 
the number and demographics of active employees change. This will not 
occur if the plan is converted now to a defined contribution plan. There-
fore, even if the city prefers a defined contribution plan, now is precisely 
the wrong time to make the conversion.
A separate question is the calculation of the estimate of the current 
value of future city liabilities for contributions. As a threshold matter, the 
assumptions used by the city pension fund trustees are within the norms 
of comparable unfunded pension liability calculations. The following 
Figures A-4, A-5 and A-6 compare key assumptions used by Detroit with 
those used by St. Louis and Cleveland, cities that have been identified by 
the emergency manager as comparable with Detroit. The key assump-
tions are roughly the same.
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Figure A-4. Detroit Pension Funds25
Normal Retirement
Plan Membership Contributions* Formula**                 Benefits Social Security 
Coverage26
COLA: Annual 
Amt. Maximum
Actuarial 
Assumptions
General 
Retirement 
System 
(GRS), City 
of Detroit
Active:***   
6,519
Inactive:    
11,790
Employer:
$72.2 million 
Employee:
$312.7 million
Sum of (a) basic pension 
of $12 for each of the first 
10 yrs. of service, + (b) a 
pension equal to first 10 yrs. 
of service multiplied
by 1.6% of AFC, plus 1.8% 
of AFC for each yr. of service 
greater than 10 yrs. up to 20 
yrs., plus 2.0% of AFC for 
each yr. of service greater 
than 20 yrs. up to 25 yrs., 
plus 2.2% of AFC for each 
yr. of service greater than 
25 yrs., + (c) An annuity the 
actuarial equivalent of the 
member’s accumulated con-
tributions at retirement.
Any age with
30 yrs. of service27
Age 60 with 10 yrs. 
of service,
or age 65 with 8 
years of service
Yes Benefit is  
increased annually 
by 2.25% of the 
original pension 
amount at retire-
ment.
Interest:  
7.9% (Net)
Wage Infla-
tion: 4%
Deferred 
Retirement: 
Option Plan 
(DROP)
Police and 
Fire 
Retirement 
System
Active:       
3,580
Inactive:    
5,370
Employer: $49.8 
million
Employee:
$9.5 million
An annuity equal to the actu-
arial equivalent of member’s 
accumulated contribution 
account 
+ a defined benefit, which, 
when added to the annuity, 
will provide the following:
Pre 1969 Members
2.0% of AFC times the 
first 25 yrs of service, with 
a maximum allowance of 
15/22 of a police officer’s or 
firefighter’s annual rate of 
compensation.
1969 Plan Members
2.5% of AFC times the first 
25 yrs. of service + 2.1% of 
AFC times each of the next 
10 yrs.  of service
25 years of service 
regardless of age. 
DPOA and their 
Fire equivalents - 
20 yrs. of service 
regardless of age.
No 1.9%28 Interest:   
8% (Net)
Salary:  
4% 
Deferred 
Retirement: 
Option Plan 
(DROP)
* General Retirement System members have the option of choosing one of four contribution amounts: (1) 0 percent; (2) 3 percent of compensation up to the Social Security wage 
base, plus 5 percent of compensation in excess of the Social Security wage base; (3) 5 percent of total compensation; or (4) 7 percent of total compensation of Detroit pension 
funds.29
** For members who retired or vested their pensions after July 1, 1992, and prior to July 1, 1998: sum of (a) a basic pension of $12 for each of the first 10 years of service, plus 
(b) a pension equal to the first 10 years of service multiplied by 1.5 percent of average final compensation (AFC), plus 1.7 percent of AFC for each year of service greater than 10 
years up to 20 years, plus 1.9 percent of AFC for each year of service over 20 years, plus (c) an annuity that is the actuarial equivalent of the member’s accumulated contributions 
at retirement. For members who retired prior to July 1, 1992, and members who vested their pensions prior to July 1, 1992: 1.5 percent for the first 10 years and 1.63 percent 
for each year greater than 10, of average final compensation, times years of service. Members who left employment after October 1, 2005, will no longer lose prior service time, 
regardless of time separated from city employment.
*** This number has dropped by 10.1 percent from 7,250, just since the 2011 report. There are 2,233 (34.2 percent of this number) terminated plan members entitled to but not 
yet receiving benefits.
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Figure A-5. St. Louis Pension Funds30
Normal Retirement
Plan Membership Contributions Formula                   Benefits
Social 
Security 
Coverage
COLA: 
Annual Amt. 
Maximum 
Actuarial 
Assumptions
Employees 
Retirement 
System
Active:     5,545
Inactive:  6,370
Employer:
$27,116,763
Employee:
Non-Contributory
1.3% of compensation 
times yrs. of service up to 
$56,628, plus 2.05% of 
compensation times yrs. 
of service above $56,628
Age 65 with 5 
years of service, 
or Rule of 85
Yes 5% Interest:8%
Salary: 
Varied
Deferred Retirement: 
Option Plan (DROP)
Firemen 
Retirement 
System
Active:       650
Inactive:    1,068
Employer:
$17,854,546
Employee:
$2,942,373
40% of compensation for 
first 20 yrs. of service, 
plus 2% for each of the 
next 5 yrs. of service, plus 
5% for each yr. over 25 
yrs. Maximum: 30 years
20 years of 
service
No 5% Interest: 7.625%
Salary: 4% 
Deferred Retirement: 
Option Plan (DROP)
Police 
Retirement 
System
Active:       1,141
Inactive:    2,093
Employer:
$17,476,138
Employee:
$4,463,218
2% of compensation for 
first 25 years of service, 
plus 4% for each of the 
next 5 years, plus 5% for 
all service after 30 years
75% of compen-
sation
No 3% Interest: 7.75%
Salary: 5% 
Deferred Retirement: 
Option Plan (DROP)
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Figure A-6. Cleveland Pension Funds31,32
Normal Retirement
Plan Membership Contributions33 Formula                    Benefits
Soc  
Security 
Coverage
COLA: Max. 
Annual Amt.
Actuarial
Assumptions
Employees 
Retirement 
System
Active:     
348,235*
(5,914)34
Inactive: 
467,298*
Employer:
14%
Employee:
10%
Annual benefit 
based on 2.2% of 
final average salary 
multiplied by actual 
years of service 
for first 30 yrs. of 
service credit and 
2.5% for yrs. of 
service in excess of 
30 yrs.
Age 55 with 32 
years of service
Age 67 with 5 years 
of service
No 3% rate tied 
to the annual 
consumer price 
index
Interest:  8.00%
Salary: 4.25%-
10.05%
(Includes wage 
inflation at 3.75%)
Deferred 
Retirement: Ohio 
Public Employees 
Deferred Compen-
sation Program
Firemen 
Retirement 
System
Active:
24,314*  
Inactive:
11,545*
Employer:
18.1%
Employee:
11.5%
Annual benefits 
calculated by 
multiplying 2.5% of 
final average salary 
actual years of
service for first 
25 yrs. of service 
and 2.1% of final 
average salary for 
yrs. of
over 25 yrs.
Age 56 with 25 
years 
of service
Age 64 with 15 
years 
of service
No The lesser of 
the Consumer 
Price Index or 
3% for those 
members who 
have less than 
 15 yrs. of ser-
vice credit as of 
July 1, 2013
Interest:  
8.00%
Salary: 
4.25%-10.05%
(Includes wage 
inflation at 3.75%)
Deferred  
Retirement: 
Ohio Public Employ-
ees Deferred Com-
pensation Program
Police 
Retirement 
System
Active:   
30,493*
Inactive:    
15,639*
Employer:
18.1%
Employee:
12.1%
Annual benefits 
calculated by 
multiplying 2.5% of 
final average salary 
actual years of
service for first 
25 yrs. of service 
and 2.1% of final 
average salary for 
yrs. of
over 25 yrs.
Age 52 with 25 
years of service
Age 64 with 15 
years of service
No The lesser of 
the Consumer 
Price Index or 
3% for those 
members who 
have less than 
 15 yrs. of ser-
vice credit as of 
July 1, 2013
Interest:  
8.00%
Salary: 
4.25%-10.05%
(Includes wage 
inflation at 3.75%)
Deferred 
Retirement: 
Ohio Public Employ-
ees Deferred Com-
pensation Program
* These are Ohio statewide numbers. There are 2,414 covered active employees and 2,349 covered retired employees of the city enrolled in the Ohio Police & Fire 
Pension Fund. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 2012 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report: Securing the Future for Ohio’s Police & Firefighters (Columbus, OH: 
Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 2013)  87, accessed October 17, 2013, www.op-f.org/Files/CAFR2012.pdf. 
It is absolutely fundamental that unfunded pension liability should 
never be thought of as a precise calculation at any given point in time. 
All assumptions are extraordinarily broad estimates. The calculation is 
a guidepost that provides a tool to monitor future expenditures to fund 
a pension plan as time moves forward. It should not be thought of as a 
calculation that provides precise meaning on any particular date. Rather, 
it is an estimate that is meaningful in the context of continuous estimates 
over a period of years. Precise evaluation of the outcome of a given port-
folio of investments compared with benefits paid can only be accom-
plished retrospectively and over long time frames.
The emergency manager engaged an actuarial consultant, Milliman 
Inc., to calculate the city’s unfunded pension liabilities using alternative 
methodologies. The emergency manager is authorized under the emer-
gency manager statute to assume control of a pension fund if its future 
liabilities are less than 80 percent funded according to actuarial calcula-
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tion.35 So if the emergency manager wants to gain control of the pension 
funds, he would have an incentive to use extreme assumptions in order 
to depict the unfunded liability as a high percentage of the total liability. 
The alternative methodologies used by the consultant involve three 
significant issues:
1 .  A S S U M E D  I N V E S TM E N T  R E T U R N
A pension plan must be analyzed based on a long-term view. Pension 
funds involve perhaps the longest duration liabilities and assets in finance. 
Traditionally, the time horizon for such plans has been 30 years.36 A pen-
sion fund holds investments that earn uncertain amounts over their lives. 
“‘Underfunded’ means that the liabilities (the obligations to pay pensions 
under defined benefit retirement plans) exceed the assets (the investment 
portfolio) that have accumulated for the purpose of funding those re-
quired payments. These assets are a combination of invested corporate 
contributions and the returns on those investments.”37 In order to es-
timate the “unfunded” amount, one must make assumptions about the 
amount of these earnings over a given time horizon. Once the estimated 
performance of investments is calculated, this can be compared with the 
estimated benefits to be paid out during the period included in the time 
horizon, to provide the further estimate of how much must be contrib-
uted to balance estimated cash demands with the cash estimated to be 
available from the investments. Thus, the earnings rate is an important 
factor in calculating an estimated “unfunded” amount.
The pension funds themselves used 7.9 percent and 8 percent (net 
of investment fees and other costs), respectively, for estimating future 
returns on its general employee funds and its police and fire employee 
funds. As described above, these rates are not out of the norm for such 
calculations for other comparable plans. It is important to keep in mind 
that these investment rates are not intended to be returns in a single year 
or over a few years, but rather over the long term, and the norms have 
been developed based on historic long-term returns from, for example, 
stock markets.
The return assumptions used by the funds are well within accepted 
practices. In fact, in a survey of assumptions used by 126 pension funds 
recently released by the National Association of State Retirement Admin-
istrators, the most common return assumption used was 8.0 percent.38 
Figure A-7, from the survey, illustrates these findings.
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The financial crash of 2008-09 generated a good deal of discussion 
about assumed return levels that have been commonly used. There is 
no doubt that the crash was an aberration from historic stock market 
returns experienced over long cycles. Those who advocate lower return 
assumptions generally characterize their assumptions as more indicative 
of a “mature economy” for the United States. The problem is that no one 
knows what the future of the U.S. economy will be, especially given the 
long cycles involved.
The Milliman report, from the emergency manager’s consultant, in-
cluded three return-based scenarios for each of the two classes of pension 
funds: for general employee funds—6.30 percent, 7.0 percent and 7.50 
percent; and for police and fire employee funds—6.57 percent, 7.00 per-
cent, and 7.50 percent. There are several concerning aspects of Milliman’s 
use of these assumptions. 
•	 In contrast, Milliman used a 7.65 percent return in its survey 
of 100 pension plans published in October 2012.39 There is 
no indication of why the lower assumptions were used in the 
reports prepared at the request of the emergency manager. 
•	 There is no disclosure of the assumed inflation rate. Without 
that, it is impossible to know what the “real rate of return” 
is—that is, the return on investment in excess of inflation. The 
real rate of return is critical to evaluating the outcome of the 
calculations. 
Figure A-7. Distribution Of Investment Return Assumptions
>7.0 <7.5 7.50 >7.5<7.75 7.75 7.90 8.00 >8.0
%
8
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Source: Public Fund Survey, Oct 2013
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•	 Milliman serves as the official actuary for many pension 
funds. It routinely uses investment return assumptions that 
are in line with those used by the funds. For example, the state 
of Oregon valuation report uses 8 percent;40 and the report 
for the state of Florida uses 7.75 percent.41 
•	 The Milliman report assumes investment and administrative 
expenses of 0.50 percent per year. This is an extraordinarily 
high amount (half of that amount is common), but it is not 
explained.  
•	 Moreover, the report included probabilities that the scenarios 
would actually occur. For example, it concludes there is a 
50 percent probability that the general pension fund will 
achieve at least a 6.30 percent net return on investment. 
From a finance perspective, such a probability is completely 
incalculable. It is important to note that these probabilities are 
enormously speculative, implying a level of knowledge about 
future investment returns that simply does not exist.  
The emergency manager has publicly announced his unfunded liabili-
ty figure is based on the 7.00 percent assumption. However, it is not com-
pletely clear that the $3.5 billion figure for the city’s unfunded pension 
liability was calculated using this precise assumption.42 The effect of this 
single assumption on the unfunded pension liability calculation cannot 
be measured reliably without applying it to the actual projected benefits 
(to cite just one example, the annual reduction of the number of current 
retirees drawing benefits) and incorporating the assumed inflation rate 
so that “real” returns can be calculated. Milliman appears to have stopped 
short of a complete inquiry (for example, not tailoring the calculation to 
expected annual reductions in the number of the existing retirees draw-
ing benefits). Instead, Milliman indicates it has relied on “rules of thumb” 
in this key calculation. It also does not disclose inflation rate assump-
tions. Differences in these factors can materially change the estimated 
unfunded pension liability that is calculated, and small percentage differ-
ences change the absolute dollar amount by significant factors. 
 
2.  S M O O T H I N G 
The historic view of pension plans is based on a 30-year time hori-
zon. Payment plans for unfunded pension liabilities in the context of dy-
namic valuations using current financial market price movements have 
often been modified by pension plan administrators. Payment plans are 
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modified so that they are less sensitive to short- and intermediate-term 
price movements. The modification technique is called “smoothing.” The 
technique distributes both losses and profits over a longer period. Most 
often, the period used is five years. Detroit uses a longer period of seven 
years, which is not unheard of but is less common. Therefore, Detroit 
recognizes both profits and losses in its funding calculation evenly over 
a seven-year period.
The smoothing policy has particular relevance in light of the financial 
market volatility over the last five years. At the outset of the financial 
crisis, stock market values plummeted. The market losses experienced by 
the city’s pension funds were not fully recognized immediately because 
of smoothing. In fact, because Detroit uses a seven-year period, a portion 
of those losses has not yet been recognized. However, the markets have 
recovered since 2008-09. For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
peaked before the crash at 14,165 and is now more than 15,000. Smooth-
ing deferred the fall from the pre-2009 peak, but it has also deferred the 
gains from the recovery. Therefore, smoothing involves countervailing 
effects on current valuation of assets held by the pension fund. Smooth-
ing does have this offsetting effect, although after its effects are realized, 
the gains may not fully offset losses.
The Milliman report to the emergency manager estimates the current 
effect of smoothing on the city pension fund calculation. For the two 
pension fund categories, the Milliman report estimates that smoothing 
has caused the current fair value of the pension fund assets to be $1.35 
billion too high. In making its estimate, the report eliminates smoothing 
from the calculation rather than using a less aggressive form of smooth-
ing. This is a very significant change since that would increase the appar-
ent unfunded liability by 269 percent. However, unless there is another 
stock market crash, smoothing means that both deferred losses and de-
ferred gains will be realized in future years, reducing the effects of as yet 
unrealized losses. While the delay in recognizing the losses in 2009 will 
continue until 2016 it is already being offset by the delay in recognizing 
gains from the stock market price increase since that time. Eventually, 
the effect of smoothing of recognized gains will mitigate the effect of 
smoothing of recognized losses.
The best way to evaluate these two approaches is to recognize that they 
achieve two different results. What Milliman has described is the current 
market value of the fund investments. Smoothing calculates a payment 
plan for paying unfunded pension liabilities by delaying the realization of 
market losses and gains. This distinction is important to understanding 
the meaning of the number reported.
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3.  A M O R T I Z AT I O N  O F  U N F U N D E D  A M O U N T
The observations by Milliman regarding the amortization of the un-
funded pension liability do not affect the amount of the unfunded pen-
sion liability. These are recommendations for a plan the city might con-
sider for funding the unfunded amount in the future, regardless of its 
calculated amount. 
In line with the long-term views of pension funds, the city, like other 
public pension funds, assumes that unfunded pension liabilities, as they 
change from year to year because of financial market price movements 
and changing estimates of long-term benefits payments, will be amor-
tized over a rolling multiyear period. For example, contributions to cover 
the current unfunded amount are calculated to assume they will be paid 
over 30 years. The next year, a new unfunded amount is calculated and 
the contributions are recalculated to assume a new 30-year payout as well. 
The rationale for this assumption is based on the long-term nature of the 
funds and the fact that the factors for estimates of unfunded liabilities are 
constantly changing.
The Milliman report to the emergency manager takes a completely dif-
ferent approach. The rolling 30-year calculation method of payments is 
changed to a fixed period of 15 years. Comparing 15-year and 30-year 
amortization periods, this procedure would increase the annual contri-
butions by a substantial amount, approximately 35 percent in the first 
year and an increasing amount each year thereafter. The rolling period 
would continuously increase this difference. It would not affect the cur-
rent unfunded liability amount, however. Instead, it would increase the 
annual payments made over the next 15 years to fund the liability in full, 
whatever the amount of that assumed liability.
Significantly, the decision on a repayment plan can only be made by 
considering the prudence of funding liabilities sooner in balance with 
the cash available to the city and the intermediate term profile of the 
plan. A 15-year amortization is not “correct” by definition. It could be 
longer or even shorter depending on the revenues available to the city 
after other cash demands are met, and depending on the appropriate 
time horizon for the plan. Fifteen years is arbitrary and unguided by 
important factors that remain unknown.
These assumption changes made by the emergency manager’s consul-
tants substantially increase the unfunded pension liability of the city to 
a level that is substantially higher than that made by the pension funds. 
However, the calculations are so opaque and the methodology so inac-
curate that the resulting $3.5 billion figure must be seen as unreliable. 
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At a minimum, the emergency manager should make these calculations 
transparent, and Milliman should properly inquiry into the circum-
stances of the system. 
Healthcare Benefits
The emergency manager reports a future liability for healthcare ben-
efits for city employees of $5.7 billion. This is an extraordinarily large 
figure when compared with the same figures for the 61 largest cities in the 
United States.43 It is common for cities to operate healthcare benefits sys-
tems on a pay-as-you-go basis, as Detroit does. For the 61 largest cities, 
the aggregate pre-funded amount is only 6 percent.44
If the city’s liability is accurately reported, the city must either (a) have 
a large number of employees for the size of its population and/or (b) have 
an extraordinarily generous healthcare benefits scheme and/or (c) use 
assumptions to calculate current liability for future costs could that are 
extraordinarily conservative. As described above, the number of employ-
ees per capita is in line with St. Louis and Cleveland, comparable cities in 
the view of the emergency manager. Detroit’s healthcare benefits are also 
very reasonable, as set forth in Figure A-8 below.
Figure A-8. City of Detroit Summary of Health Benefits 45
Benefits Non-Union Retirees Pre-1994 Union 
Retirees
Post-1994 Union 
Retirees
Medicare Retirees
Office visit $25 Per Visit $10 Per Visit $25 Per Visit $10 Per Visit
Urgent care $25 Per Visit $10 Per Visit $25 Per Visit $10 Per Visit
Emergency Rm $100 Per Visit $75 Per Visit $100 Per Visit $50 Per Visit
Hospital Admission $100 Per Admission N/A $100 Per Admission N/A
Annual In-Network Deduct-
ible
$250 Per Person
$500 Per Family
$175 Per Person
$350 Per Family
$250 Per Person
$500 Per Family
$175 Per Person
$350 Per Family
Annual Max. In-Network $1,500 Per Person
$3,000 Per Family
$825 Per Person
$1,650 Per Family
$1,500 Per Person
$3,000 Per Family
$825 Per Person
Prescription Drug Benefit Three Tier Rx Drug Plan 
Co-Pay
Generic - $10
Preferred Brand - $20
Non-Preferred Brand $30
Two Tier Rx Drug 
Plan Co-Pay
Generic - $5
Brand Name $15
Three Tier Rx Drug 
Plan Co-Pay
Generic $10
Preferred Brand - $35
Non-Preferred Brand 
- $50
Two Tier Rx Drug 
Plan Co-Pay
Tier 1: Generic - $5
Brand Name - $15
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The origin of the $5.7 billion future liability cited by the emergency 
manager is unspecified. It was probably derived from a brief by The Pew 
Charitable Trusts in August 2013 called “Cities Squeezed by Pension and 
Retiree Health Care Shortfalls,”46 which is a shorter update of a fuller 
Pew study of city pensions from January 2013 titled “A Widening Gap in 
Cities: Shortfalls in Funding for Pensions and Retiree Health Care.”47 The 
earlier study of the future healthcare benefit liabilities of 61 U.S. cities 
cites a figure of $ 4.97 billion for Detroit, without any explanation for its 
relatively large size. Similar figures were generated previously by Detroit’s 
finance department.
The relatively large size of the estimated unfunded future liability for 
Detroit appears to derive from three factors. First, as described above, 
the city population has been shrinking for a long time. City employment 
levels have been shrinking as well. This has been accelerated because of 
the city’s revenue decline. Stated simply, Detroit may have more retirees 
per capita than a city whose population and revenue base has been more 
stable.
The second and third factors may be more significant. Since the calcu-
lations were done, plan benefits may have substantially decreased and co-
pays have increased, depending on the source data used. In addition, the 
city finance department has used conservative assumptions to estimate 
future costs related to healthcare. They are set forth in Figure A-9 below.
Figure A-9. City of Detroit Health/Life Benefit Plans48
Valuation Date June 30, 2011 June 30, 2011
Actuarial Cost Method Individual Entry Age Individual Entry Age
Amortization Method Level Percent Level Dollar
Amortization Period for Unfunded Accrued 
Liabilities
30 years, open 30 years, open
Asset Valuation Method N/A 3 year smoothed market
Actuarial Assumptions
Investment Rate of Return 4.0% 5.0%
Projected Salary Increases* 4.0% N/A
Healthcare Cost Trend Line 9.0% for 2012, grading down to 4.5% 
in 2021 and 4% in 2022 and beyond
N/A
*Includes inflation rate of 4%
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The healthcare liability assumptions for Cleveland (which uses the 
Ohio state system for administration) are significantly different, particu-
lar those relating to healthcare cost trends. They are described in Figure 
A-10.
It is notable that the healthcare cost trend line is substantially higher 
for Detroit than the one used by Cleveland. These are much higher than 
recent healthcare cost increase levels. A substantial portion of the calcu-
lated healthcare cost liability is attributable to this difference.
Simply stated, it appears that Detroit’s estimates are higher than other 
cities’ because they have assumed larger increases in healthcare costs and 
used low discount rates to calculate the present value of future liabili-
ties. In particular, the healthcare cost trend line assumption far exceeds 
the current trend in healthcare cost increases, which has averaged close 
to 4 percent in recent years.49 Furthermore, the figure relied on by the 
emergency manager may be simply out-of-date, based on the current 
program. This highlights the problem of aggregating estimates of future 
expenditures with hard debt amounts. They are apples and oranges. But 
this fact is obscured by the use of the $18 billion headline number.
Figure A-10. The Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) 
Key Methods and Assumptions used in Pension and Healthcare Actuarial Valuations
Actuarial Information Pension Health Care
Valuation date December 31, 2011 December, 2011
Actuarial cost method Individual  entry age Individual entry age normal
Amortization method: Level percentage of pay, open
Traditional Pension Plan 
and Combined Plan
Level  percentage of pay, open
Member-Directed Plan Level dollar, open
Amortization period: 30 years
Traditional Pension Plan 29 years
Combined Plan 1 year
Member-Directed Plan 30 years
Asset valuation method 4-year, smoothed marker—12% corridor 4-year, smoothed market—12% corridor
Actuarial assumptions:
Investment rate of return 8.00% 5.0%
Projected salary increases 4.25%-10.05%
(includes wage inflation at 3.75%)
4.25%-10.05%
(includes wage inflation at 3.75%)
Health care cost trend rate N/A 8.0% initial, 3.75% ultimate
Source: OPERS’ Finance Division. (2013). The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. Columbus, OH: Ohio Public Employees Retirement System. 
Retrieved October 5, 2013, from https://www.opers.org/pubs-archive/investments/cafr/2012-CAFR.pdf
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S U M M A R Y
The aggregate long-term liabilities of the city are only indirectly related 
to the issue of current cash flow shortfalls that have caused its insolvency 
and bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the $18 billion shortfall figure asserted by 
the emergency manager has been reported by many news organizations 
and has deeply affected public opinion. This figure is misleading in sev-
eral respects.
•	 The $5.8 billion of Water and Sewerage Department revenue 
debt is payable from the revenues of a utility system enterprise 
that is more than four times the size of the city.
•	 The $1.45 billion pension funding COPS and the related 
swaps are offset by investments set aside for future payment 
of pension fund liabilities. The interrelationship between the 
COPs and the estimated pension liabilities is complex and 
must be considered.
•	 The $350 million termination payment for the pension fund 
financing swaps should be avoided in whole or in part.
•	 The $3.5 billion unfunded amount of the pension fund 
liability is calculated using extreme assumptions that do 
not align with assumptions used widely by municipalities 
and states. In any case, it is an estimate, not a firm liability 
comparable to a debt obligation.
•	 The estimated $5.7 billion future liability for healthcare 
benefits is, at a minimum, questionable and based on 
conservative assumptions. In addition, it is an estimate, not a 
firm liability comparable to a debt obligation.
Therefore, the accuracy and relevance of $16.8 billion of the emer-
gency manager’s $18 billion assertion, repeated time and again by the 
media, is subject to severe doubt.  
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